カンボジア Cambodia ←Wikipediaリンク
Japan Times-Opinion/Japan shouldn't act like China in Cambodia
…英字新聞・本文 (人権団体サイドの見解)
スラッシュリーディングと用語の説明など
カンボジアについての基本知識と英語表現
2019年10月5日、カンボジア王国主催「クメール語、スピーチ・コンテスト2019年」が在日カンボジア王国大使館で開催され、見学する機会に恵まれました。小学校5年生から高校まで、私が英語を教えていた大学1年の生徒に、書類選考が通ったということで招待されたのです。正直、私はクメール語が全くわからないので、不安満載の訪問でしたが、初めてカンボジア人の方々と英語で話す機会も得て、とても楽しい時間を過ごせました。
スピーチコンテスト時のブログはこちら
恥ずかしながら、大使館訪問前は、カンボジアについての知識は非情に薄く、世界遺産のアンコールワット、ポルポト派、シラヌーク殿下という言葉が浮かぶくらいで、長い内戦の詳細やカンボジアの現状について、ほとんど知りませんでした。そこで、ネットの情報などを少し入れてから訪問しました。
印象的だったのは、東京外語大学の交換留学生として、1週間前にカンボジアから日本に来たというプノンペン大学の生徒との会話です。
私の質問: What is the most interesting thing for you in Japan?
彼女の答え: Education.
20歳前後の女の子の日本への興味とは、「ファッションなどかな~」などと軽く考えて尋ねた私は、ちょっと恥ずかしくなりました。カンボジアでは、内戦で知識人がたくさん亡くなったと聞きます。日本で一番興味があるのが、「教育」という答えに、彼女の留学に対する真剣さが伝わってきました。
「実際に会って話をする」ことで、カンボジア人が好きになり、相手国の幸福を願う気持ちが湧きました。クメール語ができることが一番でしょうが、やはり英語はコミュニケーションを取るのに役立ちました。若い世代が親しくなることで、両国の友好関係の発展を願わずにはいられません。
以下、The Japan Timesの「OPINION」内に、2019年3月27日に上げられていた記事です。一党支配制をとる中国、現カンボジアの選挙制度、それに力を貸す日本への批判も含まれた内容です。友好気分を戒める内容で、異論・反論もあると思いますが、厳しい意見もしっかり聞くことは、正しい現状把握に不可欠と思います。私個人としては、多民族国家の多いアジア諸国で、欧米諸国的考え方だけでは問題解決がむずかしいと思うこともあります。記事を読みながら、深く考えるきっかけを作っていただけたら幸いです。
*1~*4はスラッシュリーディングによる直訳をしてみてください。番号をタップまたはクリックすると、解説に飛べます。
Japan shouldn't act like China in Cambodia
by Teppei Kasai and Brad Adams Mar 27, 2019
In a dimly lit ballroom at a Tokyo luxury hotel, Sok Chenda Sophea, the
secretary-general of the Council for the Development of Cambodia and the
minister attached to Prime Minister Hun Sen, persistently asked about 200
Japanese businesspeople to invest in Cambodia.
“Cambodia is not mini-China, come [visit],” Sophea said at the Cambodian
Investment Forum on March 5. Sophea’s 30-minute speech mentioned everything
from special economic zones to Japanese Official Development Assistance
(ODA).
But Cambodia’s major crackdown on dissent and its ban on the main opposition
party before last year’s election were not on his agenda. When questioned
by Human Rights Watch about whether the Cambodian government has concrete
strategies to ensure rights protections for the Cambodian people amid a
growing number of foreign investments and development projects, Sophea
dodged the question.
“I’m sorry to say, but we’re in a business seminar,” Sophea said, apparently
not concerned that illegal land confiscation for business projects and
the abuse of workers are among the country’s biggest rights problems.
Japan has been important to Cambodia, for decades its largest aid donor
and one of its largest foreign investors. Now, with China surpassing Japan
in both areas, the Japanese government appears willing to throw its principles
out the window to compete with China for Hun Sen’s affections.
Given Hun Sen’s dictatorial and violent record, this is a contest that
Japan can’t — and shouldn’t want to — win.
Despite Sophea’s denials, in recent years, Hun Sen, who has held power
for 34 years, and Chinese President Xi Jinping have been inseparable. *1 They kicked off 2019 by striking a deal involving what Hun Sen described
as a Chinese grant of nearly $600 million and a pledge to import 400,000
tons of Cambodian rice. The two agreed on a target of $10 billion in bilateral
trade by 2023.
The deal was topped off by smaller investments and loans, including an
agreement from China to provide a bodyguard compound for Cambodia’s Council
of Ministers. This is very worrisome, given that Hun Sen’s bodyguard unit
has long been responsible for bloody attacks on the prime minister’s critics,
including an infamous 1997 grenade attack on a political demonstration
by the then-leader of the opposition, Sam Rainsy.
For Xi and Hun Sen, it was business as usual. *2 Since the 1998 demise of the Khmer Rouge, which China helped propel to
power, leading to the deaths of as many as 2 million Cambodians, China
has poured billions of dollars into Cambodia in loans, aid and investments.
By 2010, China became Cambodia’s largest foreign donor, though much of
its aid is in loans that Cambodia may never be able to repay. In 2018,
China accounted for nearly half of Cambodia’s $6 billion foreign debt.
Presiding over a one-party state at home, the Chinese government doesn’t
have to consider public opinion when supporting dictatorships or account
for the expenditure of its funds. It can bribe officials with impunity.
Things are different in Japan.
This has left Japan in a bind. Despite the worsening climate for human
rights in Cambodia, Japan still shies away from open and clear criticism, while
continuing to provide large amounts of aid and staging high-level visits, all
to charm the deeply unpopular Hun Sen.
But Japan is fighting a losing battle for Hun Sen’s support. Japan can’t
outspend China or deliver sweetheart contracts to Cambodia, yet its overt
and clumsy attempts to ingratiate itself have led to a backlash among Cambodian
activists, who see Tokyo selling out democracy and human rights to maintain
a friendship with a dictator. Activists see this “values free” Japanese
diplomacy contributing to the seemingly irreversible decline of democratic
values in Cambodia.
That became increasingly apparent in the lead-up to the July 2018
Cambodian national elections. Fearing defeat, the government dissolved the
opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), kicked its members out of
parliament and imposed a five-year political ban on 118 of its senior members.
Hun Sen also cracked down on independent media outlets and journalists, and
independent organizations promoting the rule of law, democracy and human
rights.
Hun Sen’s abuse of power evoked strong reactions from dozens of countries,
including at the United Nations Human Rights Council. Countries urged the
Cambodian government to reinstate the CNRP and all elected members.
*3 The European Union in December condemned the dissolution of the CNRP and
ended all funding for the 2018 general election, stating that “an electoral
process from which the main opposition party has been arbitrarily excluded
cannot be seen as legitimate.” Sweden, a longtime donor, announced that
it would end its aid to the Cambodian government except for education and
research. The United States suspended most aid.
Yet Japan broke ranks with the other democracies and stayed largely silent.
It provided Cambodia with electoral aid, ballot boxes and pickup trucks
to prepare for what was clearly a sham election. In April 2018, two months
after Japan announced its election aid, Foreign Minister Taro Kono and
Cambodia’s Foreign Affairs Minister Prak Sokhonn signed a grant and loan
agreement worth more than $90 million.
Hun Sen claimed a landslide victory for the ruling Cambodian People’s Party,
taking all 125 seats in parliament, effectively ending democratic governance
and joining the ranks of China, Laos and Vietnam as one-party states. Despite
this outcome, the secretary-general of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic
Party, Toshihiro Nikai, sent a letter to Hun Sen extolling his electoral
success without a hint of irony: “I heartily congratulate you on your party’s
overwhelming victory in the general election.”
Sadly, Tokyo’s latest actions betray the admirable legacy of Japan in the
democratization of Cambodia in the 1990s. Japan was a major player in the
1991 Paris Peace Agreements, which set out the transformation of Cambodia
into a democracy and an end to the war with the Khmer Rouge. A Japanese
diplomat, Yasushi Akashi, led the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia,
the huge U.N. peacekeeping and national reconstruction mission. At the
cost of many lives, including two Japanese nationals, Japan helped bring
about Cambodia’s first democratic election in 1993.
*4 Cambodia’s return to a one-party state has prompted Akashi, normally very
wary of offering public criticism, and several Japanese academics and experts
on Cambodia to publicly call for a system that will “ensure that Japan’s
election and legal reform assistance are not utilized to justify heavy-handed
governments.” That would involve creating a new Japanese Foreign Ministry
post occupied by an external expert to require that Japan’s ODA programs
promote democratic values.
Their recommendations should be heeded. They are also consistent with long-standing
Japanese policy. The Japanese Development Cooperation Charter states that
“Japan will provide assistance so as to share universal values such as
freedom, democracy, respect for basic human rights and the rule of law.”
It does not provide an exception for competition with China.
The Japanese government should re-emphasize the democratic and human rights
values it had once placed at the core of its diplomatic relations with
Cambodia. The welfare of the Cambodian people should take precedence over
relations with an abusive leader like Hun Sen. Indeed, Japan’s priority
should be to join with other democratic governments to pressure Cambodia
to meet its international human rights obligations.
The European Union has initiated a review of Cambodia under the human
rights provisions of its Everything-but-Arms trade benefits program, and the
U.S. is considering invoking the labor rights provisions of its Generalized
System of Preferences trade program there.
The Japanese government should trigger human rights-based
conditionality enshrined in its ODA programs and charter and suspend aid unless
Cambodia stops violating those conditions. If Japan wants to have an important
role in Cambodia again, it should quickly switch its soft diplomacy approach
toward Cambodia to a values-based one. When Hun Sen one day loses power, the
Cambodian people will remember who was on their side.
Brad Adams is the Human Rights Watch Asia director and Teppei Kasai is
the program officer in its Tokyo office. ©2019, The Diplomat; distributed by
Tribune Content Agency, LLC.
スラッシュリーディングと用語の説明など
複雑な文では、主語となる部分をピンク、動詞を青で示しています。
語句や文法の説明は、緑で示しています。
むずかしそうな単語は赤にしているので、後で覚えてみてください。
Japan shouldn't act /like China in Cambodia
by Teppei Kasai and Brad Adams Mar 27, 2019
In a dimly lit ballroom at a Tokyo luxury hotel, /Sok Chenda Sophea, the secretary-(つまり)general of the Council for the Development of Cambodia/ and the minister/ attached to Prime Minister Hun Sen(ハンセン首相に任命された公使/ambassador=大使), persistently asked about 200 Japanese businesspeople/ to invest in Cambodia.
“Cambodia is not mini-China, /come [visit],(命令形/ノン・ネイティブなのでこの表現になっている?)” Sophea said at the Cambodian Investment Forum on March 5. Sophea’s 30-minute speech mentioned everything/ from special economic zones to Japanese Official Development
Assistance (ODA).
But Cambodia’s major crackdown (厳重な取り締まり) on dissent (ディセントゥ/異議、反対意見) /and its ban on the main opposition party/ before last year’s election (ここまでが主語)/ were not on his agenda (協議事項、予定表).
When (分詞構文・Sohpea wasの略 ) questioned by Human Rights Watch (1978年設立の人権に関するNGO)/ about whether the Cambodian government has concrete strategies/ to ensure
rights protections for the Cambodian people/ amid a growing number of foreign
investments and development projects, //Sophea dodged (dodge=《自・他動》~を避ける、~を巧みにごまかす=evade, escape) the question.
…外国資本の呼び込みの中、カンボジア人の権利の保護について具体策があるかどうかの質問に、ソフィアは答えていません。
“I’m sorry to say, /but we’re in a business seminar,” /Sophea said, /apparently
(she was) not concerned /that illegal land confiscation (confiscation=没収) for business projects/ and the abuse (abuse=《名》アビュースゥ/不当な扱い《動》アビューズ) of workers (that以下のS)/ are (that以下のSに対するV)among the country’s biggest rights problems.
Japan has been important to Cambodia, /for decades its largest aid donor and one of its largest foreign investors.(カンマ語は主節の説明/*つまり、何十年もの間カンボジア最大の援助提供者であり、カンボジア最大の外国の投資家である。)
Now, with China surpassing (surpass=サーパスゥ=~をしのぐ) Japan in both areas (中国が支援と投資両面で日本をしのぐにつれ), /the Japanese government appears willing to throw its principles out
the window/ to compete with China for Hun Sen’s affections.
Given Hun Sen’s dictatorial (独裁的な)and violent record, (分詞構文)/this is a contest (競争)/that Japan can’t — and shouldn’t want to — win.(わかりにくい時は-~-の部分を省略して読むとわかりやすい→that Japan can't win。thatは関係代名詞目的格))
Despite Sophea’s denials, in recent years, /Hun Sen,/ who has held power for 34 years, /and Chinese President Xi Jinping have been inseparable.
*1They kicked off (kick off=を始める、を幕開けする) 2019 /by striking (strike=契約などを取り決める)a deal/ involving what Hun Sen described as a Chinese grant (財産・不動産などの・譲与) of nearly $600 million/ and a pledge (プれッジ/堅い約束) to import 400,000 tons of Cambodian rice.
*直訳…彼らは2019年を幕開けした/契約を取り決めることによって/フン・センが約6億ドルの中国の譲与と説明したものにかかわる(契約を)/そして40万トンのカンボジアの米を輸入するという堅い約束を取り決めることによって。…a
dealとa pledgeが同格。
The two (中国とカンボジア)agreed on a target of $10 billion/ in bilateral (バイらテラる/双方の) trade by 2023.
The deal was topped off (top off=終わる)/by smaller investments and loans,/ including an agreement from China/ to provide a bodyguard compound (護衛隊の宿所?) for Cambodia’s Council of Ministers (閣僚会議、内閣).
This is very worrisome (形・厄介な、心配な), /given that Hun Sen’s bodyguard unit has long been responsible for bloody
attacks on the prime minister’s critics,/ including an infamous 1997 grenade (グラネイドゥ/手りゅう弾) attack on a political demonstration/ by the then-leader of the opposition, Sam Rainsy.
For Xi and Hun Sen,/ it was business as usual.
*2Since the 1998 demise (ディマイズ/終結、譲位) of the Khmer Rouge,/ which China helped propel (~を突き動かす)to power,/ leading to the deaths of as many as 2 million Cambodians,/ China
has poured billions of dollars into Cambodia/ in loans, aid and investments.
*直訳…クメール・ルージュの1998年の終結以来/そしてそれを、中国は権力に向かって突き動かすのを手助けしたが/(そしてそのことが)2百万人ものカンボジア人の死につながったのだが//(ここから主節)中国は何十億ドルも(の資金を)カンボジアに注いできた/貸付、援助、そして投資という形で。
By 2010,/ China became Cambodia’s largest foreign donor,/ though much of
its aid is in loans/ that Cambodia may never be able to repay.
In 2018,/ China accounted for (account for=(割合)を占める、~の理由を説明する) nearly half of Cambodia’s $6 billion foreign debt.
Presiding over (preside over=~を統括する)a one-party (party=政党) state at home,/ the Chinese government doesn’t have to consider public
opinion/ when supporting dictatorships or account for the expenditure (支出、経費) of its funds (資金).
It can bribe (~にわいろを贈る) officials with impunity (インピュニティー/刑罰を受けないこと).
Things are different in Japan.
This has left Japan in a bind (in a bind/《米略式》困って、焦って).
Despite the worsening climate (傾向) for human rights in Cambodia,/ Japan still shies away from (shy away from=~からひきさがる) open and clear criticism, /while continuing to provide large amounts of aid and staging high-level visits,/ *all to charm the deeply unpopular Hun Sen. (toは結果を表す不定詞…*結局ひどく不人気なフン・センを喜ばせるだけだ。)
But Japan is fighting a losing battle/ for Hun Sen’s support.
Japan can’t outspend (~より多くの金を使う) China/ or deliver sweetheart (《米》双方に有利な《その場にいない第三者には不利な》) contracts to Cambodia, /yet its overt (オウばートゥ/明白な) and clumsy (クらムズィ/不器用な) attempts to ingratiate (イングリーシエイトゥ/~oneself=取り入る) itself/ have led to a backlash (バックらッシュ/大衆の反発、抵抗) among Cambodian activists, /who see Tokyo selling out (sell out=~を敵に売り渡す) democracy and human rights /to maintain a friendship with a dictator.
Activists see this “values free” Japanese diplomacy/ contributing to the seemingly irreversible (取り消しできない) decline of democratic values in Cambodia.
That became increasingly apparent (アパーレントゥ/明白な) /in the lead-up to (~の前の段階) the July 2018 Cambodian national elections.
Fearing defeat,/ the government dissolved (dissolve=~を解散する) the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), /kicked its members
out of parliament/ and imposed a five-year political ban on 118 of its
senior members.
Hun Sen also cracked down on (crack down on=~を厳しく取り締まる) independent media outlets (販路、販売店) and journalists,/ and independent organizations/ promoting the rule of law, democracy and human rights.
Hun Sen’s abuse of power/ evoked (evoke=イぼウク/~を引き起こす=produce, ~を呼び起こす=call up) strong reactions from dozens of countries,/ including at the United Nations
Human Rights Council.
Countries urged (urge=アージ/を~するように説得する) the Cambodian government to reinstate (~を復帰させる) the CNRP and all elected members.
*3The European Union in December/ condemned the dissolution of the CNRP/
and ended all funding for the 2018 general election,/ stating (分詞構文state that~と述べて) /that “an electoral process from which the main opposition party has been
arbitrarily (アービトラリりィ=任意に、独断的に) excluded/ cannot be seen as legitimate (れジティミットゥ=適法の、正当な).”
*EUは12月/CNRPの解散を非難した/そして2018年総選挙のためのすべての資金提供を終えた/そして、(次のように)述べた/「最大野党が独断的に排除されているような選挙過程は/正当と見られることはあり得ない。」と(言明した)。
Sweden,/ a longtime donor,/ announced/ that it would end its aid to the
Cambodian government/ except for education and research.
The United States suspended (suspend=~を一時停止する) most aid.
Yet Japan broke ranks with (break ranks with=~と意見を異にする) the other democracies/ and stayed largely silent.
It provided Cambodia with electoral aid, ballot boxes and pickup trucks/
to prepare for what was clearly a sham (にせの) election.
In April 2018, / two months after Japan announced its election aid,/ Foreign Minister Taro Kono and Cambodia’s Foreign Affairs Minister Prak Sokhonn/ signed a grant (譲与) and loan agreement/ worth more than $90 million.
Hun Sen claimed a landslide victory (圧倒的な勝利) for the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (ruling party=与党),/ taking all 125 seats in parliament, /effectively ending democratic governance/
and joining the ranks of China, Laos and Vietnam/ as one-party states.
Despite this outcome,/ the secretary-general of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party, Toshihiro Nikai,/ sent a letter to Hun Sen/ extolling (extol=~を激賞する) his electoral success without a hint of irony:/ “I heartily congratulate you/ on your party’s overwhelming victory in the general election.”
Sadly,/ Tokyo’s latest actions/ betray the admirable legacy of Japan/ in
the democratization of Cambodia in the 1990s.
Japan was a major player in the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements,/ which set out the transformation of Cambodia into a democracy /and an end to the war with the Khmer Rouge.
A Japanese diplomat, Yasushi Akashi,/ led the U.N. Transitional (過渡期の) Authority in Cambodia,/ the huge U.N. peacekeeping and national reconstruction
mission.
At the cost of (~を犠牲にして) many lives,/ including two Japanese nationals,/ Japan helped bring about
Cambodia’s first democratic election in 1993.
*4Cambodia’s return to a one-party state/ has prompted Akashi,/ normally
very wary (ウェァリィ=用心深い) of offering public criticism,/ and several Japanese academics and experts on Cambodia/ to publicly call for a system/ that will “ensure /that Japan’s election and legal reform assistance/ are not utilized to justify heavy-handed (荒っぽい、高圧的な) governments.”
*文の構造…SVO+to do文;prompt Akashi~Cambodia to call for~
…直訳…カンボジアの一党(支配)国への回帰は/明石を(次の事に)駆り立てた/(明石は)普通は公共批判をするのにとても用心深いが/そしてカンボジアに関係する数人の日本の学者と専門家を(駆り立てた)/公然と制度を求めることに(駆り立てた)/「(次の事を)確実にするであろう(制度を)/日本の選挙と法律の改正の援助が/高圧的な政府を正当化することに利用されないということを(確実にするであろう制度を)。
That would involve creating a new Japanese Foreign Ministry post/ occupied
by an external expert/ to require that Japan’s ODA programs promote democratic
values.
Their recommendations should be heeded (heed=~に注意を払う).
They are also consistent with (~と調和する) long-standing Japanese policy.
The Japanese Development Cooperation Charter (憲章、宣言) states/ that “Japan will provide assistance/ so as to share universal values/ such as freedom, democracy, respect for basic human rights and the rule of law.”
It does not provide an exception/ for competition with China.
The Japanese government should re-emphasize the democratic and human rights
values/ it had once placed at the core of its diplomatic relations with
Cambodia.
The welfare of the Cambodian people/ should take precedence (プレスィデンス/プレスィーデンス=先行、優先権) over relations with an abusive (侮辱的な、虐待する) leader like Hun Sen.
Indeed, /Japan’s priority should be to join with other democratic governments/
to pressure Cambodia to meet its international human rights obligations.
The European Union has initiated a review of Cambodia/ under the human rights provisions (規定、条項) of its Everything-but-Arms trade benefits program, /and the U.S. is considering
invoking (invoke=~を発動する、実施する) the labor rights provisions of its Generalized System of Preferences trade
program there.
The Japanese government should trigger human rights-based conditionality/ enshrined in its ODA programs and charter and suspend aid (should trigger and suspendが同格)/ unless Cambodia stops violating those conditions.
If Japan wants to have an important role in Cambodia again, /it should
quickly switch its soft diplomacy approach toward Cambodia/ to a values-based
one.
When Hun Sen one day loses power,/ the Cambodian people will remember/
who was on their side.
Brad Adams is the Human Rights Watch Asia director and Teppei Kasai is
the program officer in its Tokyo office. ©2019, The Diplomat; distributed by
Tribune Content Agency, LLC.
カンボジアについての基本知識と英語表現
(wikipediaより)
Official Name |
Kingdom of Cambodia |
正式名称 |
カンボジア王国 |
Capital |
Phnom Penh |
首都 |
プノンペン |
Official language |
Khmer (クマエ) |
公用語 |
クメール語 |
Population |
about
15 million
(2013) |
人口 |
約1,500万人
(2013年) |
Area |
181,035k㎡
cf.Hokkaido
=83,424k㎡ |
面積
cf.北海道
=83,424k㎡ |
181,035k㎡ |
King
(Reign) |
Norodom Sihanouk
(シアーヌ)
(1941-1955/
1993-2004) |
国王
(在位) |
ノロドム・シアヌーク
(2041-1955/
1993-2004) |
Norodom Sihamoni
(2004-) |
ノロドム・シハモニ
(2004-) |
Prime Minister |
Hun Sen
(1998-) |
首相 |
フン・セン
(1998-) |
Independence from France |
November 9, 1953
(since 1863) |
フランスからの独立 |
1953年11月9日
(1863年から) |
The Khmer Republic |
1970-1975
General Lon Nol
The character of the new regime was. right-wing and nationalist. |
クメール共和国 |
1970年-1975年
ロン・ノル主導のクーデターでシアヌーク殿下が追放される。 |
Khmer Rouge
(Red Khmers) |
It was the name popularly given to the followers of the Communist Party
of Kampuchea.
It was led by Pol Pot in 1976. The regime murdered hundreds of thousands
of their perceived political opponents. |
クメール・ルージュ
(赤色のクメール) |
1968-1996
初めは反政府であったが、1970年以降シアヌークを支持へ。
反植民地主義+毛沢東思想
1976年、ポル・ポトを首相に選出し、非共産党の政府指導者を排除。
|
The Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation
(=Salvation Front/FUNSK) |
It was the nucleus of a new Cambodian Regime that would topple the Khmer
Rouge and later establish the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).
Its aim was to expand as a Cambodian front in order to overthrow Pol Pot's
regime of terror. |
カンプチア救国民族統一戦線 |
1978-1981
ポル・ポト政権に対する反政府運動を拡大。
1979年1月にベトナム軍の力を借り、ポル・ポト政権を崩壊させる。 |
Paris Peace Accords |
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パリ和平協定 |
1991年
カンボジア和平について合意される。 |
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世界遺産 |
Angkor Wat |
UNESCO World Heritage |
アンコール・ワット
プレアヴィヒア寺院 |
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